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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joseph Duane Herrera appeals from his conviction for second-degree
murder.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged

Herrera with second-degree murder for killing

Stephanie Camack by shooting her in the head. (R., vol. I, pp. 42-43.) The jury
convicted him as charged.

(R., vol. II, p. 263.)

The district court imposed a

sentence of life with 22 years determinate. (R., vol. 11, pp. 279-82.) Herrera filed
a timely notice of appeal. (R., vol. II, pp. 286-90.)
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ISSUES
Herrera states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the evidence of malice sufficient to support Mr.
Herrera's second degree murder conviction when it is
undisputed that Mr. Herrera believed the gun was unloaded
at the time it discharged?

2.

Did the district court err when, over Mr. Herrera's objection, it
permitted the State to present irrelevant and prejudicial
hearsay attributed to the victim?

3.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Herrera's motions
for mistrial after two of the State's final witnesses provided
prejudicial testimony on matters that had been expressly
excluded by the district court?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Herrera put the barrel of a pistol against Stephanie's head and pulled the
trigger, putting a bullet through her brain. Some evidence suggested that
Herrera made an attempt to unload the gun before doing so. Has Herrera
failed to show that the evidence of malice fails to support a conviction for
second-degree murder because the jury could have concluded that
Herrera acted with malice either because he intentionally shot Stephanie
or acted with such extreme indifference to her life that he had an
abandoned and malignant heart?

2.

To show Stephanie's state of mind, the district court admitted evidence
that Stephanie had made statements indicating her intent to end her
relationship with Herrera, but that she was having trouble doing so
because he reacted violently or with threats of suicide. Has Herrera failed
to show an abuse of discretion because the evidence was relevant to
demonstrate the significance of evidence that the homicide occurred in the
middle of an argument and while Stephanie was packing her clothes?

3.

The district court excluded evidence of injuries suffered by Stephanie prior
to the homicide. Two witnesses volunteered having seen bruises on
Stephanie, drawing motions for a mistrial. Has Herrera failed to show
error in the denial of the motions for mistrial?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Evidence Supports The Verdict
A.

Introduction
Herrera contends that the evidence does not support a finding that he

knew the gun he used to kill Stephanie Camack was loaded, and therefore the
evidence does not support his conviction.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-17.)

argument fails on both the facts and the law.

This

It fails on the facts because the

evidence supports a finding of intent to kill and therefore express malice, and
also supports a finding of extreme indifference to Stephanie's life supporting a
finding of an abandoned and malignant heart and therefore implied malice.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Knutson, 121

Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at
1072.

Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are

construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict.
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State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho

698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d
at 1072.

C.

The Evidence Supports The Verdict
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice

aforethought." I.C. § 18-4001. Malice is "express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life" and is "implied" if "the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."
I.C. § 18-4002. The evidence supports a verdict of murder on either an implied
or express malice theory.
Herrera and his girlfriend, Stephanie Comack, argued about Herrera
spending Christmas Eve at a casino and smoking methamphetamine and not
wanting to go to her parents' house for Christmas. (State's Exhibits 10, 11; Trial
Tr., vol. 1, p. 299, L. 24 - p. 300, L. 17; vol. 2, p. 91, L. 25 - p. 92, L. 9; p. 93, Ls.
5-21; p. 111, L. 15-p.116, L. 18; p. 118, L. 24-p.128, L. 2; p. 129, Ls. 4-11; p.
152, L. 8 - p. 153, L. 10.) She decided to leave him and started packing her
things.

(State's Exhibits 10, 11.)

Herrera put the muzzle of a pistol against

Stephanie's forehead and shot her. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 136, L. 5 - p. 137, L. 19;
p. 141, L. 12- p. 142, L. 3; p. 144, Ls. 6-8; p. 170, Ls. 8-17; vol. 2, p. 31, L. 22p. 39, L. 3; p. 42, L. 20 - p. 43, L. 4; p. 59, L. 23 - p. 60, L. 20; State's Exhibits
61-73.)
Herrera initially claimed that the gun "went off" when he was trying to
unload it. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 144, Ls. 9-18.) At another point he claimed the gun
"went off'' when he was "playing" with it. (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 184, L. 19 - p. 185,
4

L. 1.) In an interview with police about six hours after shooting Stephanie he said
he took the clip out of the gun, then he pulled the slide to check if there was a
shell in the chamber and the "fucking gun went off" when he let the slide snap
back into position. (Exhibit 10; Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 222, L. 20 - p. 224, L. 22.) His
explanation was inconsistent with the physical evidence in several respects.
First, the barrel of the gun was in contact with Stephanie's forehead when
Herrera shot her. (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 31, L. 22 - p. 39, L. 3; p. 42, L. 20 - p. 43,
L. 4; p. 59, L. 23 - p. 60, L. 20; State's Exhibits 61-73.) Second, tests on the
weapon indicated it would not fire by letting the slide close as claimed by
Herrera.

(Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 269, L. 21 - p. 271, L. 20.)

After hearing the

evidence at trial, Herrera claimed, for the first time, that Stephanie "grabbed the
barrel of the gun and pulled it and it went off." (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 128, Ls. 3-10.)
The evidence supports the jury's verdict.

Herrera's claims that the gun

"went off" notwithstanding, the evidence supports the conclusion that Herrera put
a loaded gun to Stephanie's head and deliberately pulled the trigger, killing her.
The evidence thus supports an inference that Herrera intended to shoot
Stephanie or that he acted with such callousness as to support a finding of an
abandoned and malignant heart.
Herrera does not contest that the evidence is sufficient to find that he put
the barrel of a loaded gun against Stephanie's forehead and pulled the trigger,
killing her, but instead claims the evidence established he did not know there was
a bullet in the chamber of the gun and therefore he acted without malice.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-17.) This argument fails on the facts and the law.
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1.

The Evidence Supports A Finding Of Express Malice

Herrera's factual argument is based on the claim he did not know there
was a round in the chamber of the gun when he fired it. The only evidence he
cites in support of this argument is evidence indicating the magazine was not in
the gun when he fired it. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-7.) Such evidence does not
preclude a finding that he knew there was a round in the chamber.

In fact,

Herrera never specifically denied knowledge of the round in the chamber,
claiming instead that the gun merely "went off." (Trial Tr., vol. 1, p. 144, Ls. 9-18;
p. 184, L. 19 - p. 185, L. 1; p. 222, L. 20 - p. 224, L. 22; Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 128,
Ls. 3-1 O; State's Exhibits 10, 11.) Although Herrera made repeated statements
that the shooting was accidental, his claim was always that pulling the trigger
was accidental, not a mistaken belief that the gun was unloaded.
The primary evidence relied on by Herrera on appeal is that the clip was
removed from the pistol before shooting Stephanie.
(and citations).)

(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-7

Herrera claimed he had removed the clip, but the jury could

have concluded that the clip was accidentally released in a struggle over the gun
in an attempt by Stephanie to keep it away from her head. Herrera testified that
Stephanie grabbed the gun just before it "went off." (Trial Tr., vol. 2, p. 128, Ls.
3-10.) The jury could have accepted that Stephanie grabbed the gun just before
Herrera shot her, but in an attempt to protect herself that ended up inadvertently
releasing the clip that fell to the floor.
In addition, even if the jury accepted Herrera's testimony that he removed
the clip prior to the shooting, the jury could still find intent to kill.
6

Although

removing the clip is inconsistent with having the intent to kill at the time the clip

was removed, it is not inconsistent with forming intent to kill after removing the
clip. The jury in this case could easily have concluded that Herrera removed the
clip at some point before he formed the intent to kill (indeed, the clip may not
have even been in the gun at the beginning of the argument). Such would not
negate knowledge of the round still in the chamber and therefore does not show
an absence of express malice.
Because there is no evidence that Herrera maintained a mistaken belief
that the gun was unloaded, and the jury was not required to accept any such
evidence anyway, the jury was free to infer from the evidence that Herrera
deliberately put the gun in Stephanie's face and pulled the trigger knowing full
well there was a single round in the chamber.

2.

The Prosecutor's Argument Was Not Evidence And Is Irrelevant To
The Question Of Sufficiency Of The Evidence

Herrera also argues that the prosecutor "expressly disavowed any claim
that Mr. Herrera acted with express malice" (Appellant's brief, p. 10) and made a
"judicial admission that precluded the jury from finding that Mr. Herrera believed
the gun was loaded at the time it discharged" (Appellant's brief, p. 15).

This

argument is a misrepresentation of the record.
First, the court specifically instructed the jurors that the "arguments and
statements of the attorneys are not evidence.

If you remember the facts

differently from the way the attorneys have stated them [y]ou should base your
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decision on what you remember." (6/19/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 23 - p. 12, L. 1.) The
jury understood that it was not bound by any argument of counsel.
Second, the prosecutor at no point told the jury to not consider any
particular theory of second-degree murder.

Rather, review of the argument

shows that the prosecutor made no concession related to the charge of seconddegree murder.
During closing argument the prosecutor reminded the jury to "draw your
own conclusion" from the evidence. (6/19/13 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 3-7.) The prosecutor
"submit[ted]" to the jury that there were "at least" five scenarios that "deserved
evaluation." (6/19/13 Tr., p. 29, L. 25 - p. 30, L. 2.) Two of the scenarios (one
given by Herrera in his police interview and the other given by Herrera on the
stand) should be rejected because they were not supported by any evidence
except Herrera's claims, which were "completely unreliable." (6/19/13 Tr., p. 30,
L. 3 - p. 34, L. 18.) After addressing scenarios one and two, the prosecutor
"submit[ted]" scenarios three and four, in which Herrera deliberately put the gun
to Stephanie's forehead and intentionally pulled the trigger, unaware he had
chambered a round, intending to frighten her or intimidate her. (6/19/13 Tr., p.
34, L. 18- p. 44, L. 2.)
The fifth scenario was that Herrera "shot her on purpose." (6/19/13 Tr., p.
44, L. 10.) In introducing the fifth scenario the prosecutor reminded the jury that
it "may think of some other scenarios" than the five addressed. (6/19/13 Tr., p.
44, Ls. 3-7.) The prosecutor discounted Herrera's claim he picked up the victim's
cell phone after the killing to call her family as evidence he did not intend the
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killing. (Trial Tr., p. 44, L. 11 - p. 45, L. 3.) He acknowledged, however, that the
evidence tended to indicate Herrera removed the clip prior to shooting Stephanie,
an act that "doesn't make any sense" if his intent was to shoot Stephanie "on
purpose." (6/19/13 Tr., p. 45, L. 4 - p. 47, L. 4.) The prosecutor stated that "the
theory of intentional first degree murder doesn't hold water because the evidence
doesn't support it." (6/19/13 Tr., p. 46, Ls. 2-7 (emphasis added).) "The scenario
which supports the first degree premeditated murder, he shot her on purpose
doesn't-is not supported by the evidence. So that's what brings us to second
degree murder. It is supported by the evidence." (6/19/13 Tr., p. 46, Ls. 20-24
(emphasis added, paragraph break omitted).)
A reading of the entire prosecutor's argument, in context, shows that the
prosecutor did not disavow express malice.

Rather, he merely acknowledged

that there were potential weaknesses in that theory and that the evidence did not
support a finding of first degree premeditated murder.

Such is hardly a

significant concession, given that it was effectively made in the charge itself.
Herrera's claim that any meaningful concession was made is simply a
misrepresentation of the record.
In addition, Herrera's claim that the "the State's position below was that
Mr. Herrera sincerely believed that the gun was unloaded at the time he pointed
it at Mr. [sic] Camack and pulled the trigger" (Appellant's brief, p. 11) is, at best,
an overstatement. Although the prosecutor acknowledged weaknesses in finding
express malice, as opposed to implied, the prosecutor reminded the jury that
such was its determination, and that there were more ways to look at the
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evidence than the potential theories he provided in argument. In short, Herrera's
claim that the prosecutor went beyond argument is factually baseless, and
because the prosecutor's argument was not evidence it is ultimately irrelevant to
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence.

3.

The Evidence Supports A Finding Of Implied Malice

Malice is implied "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."
I.C. § 18-4002. An "abandoned and malignant heart" includes the common-law
theories of "intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury murder; ... depraved-heart murder;
and ... felony murder." State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 866, 781 P.2d 197,203
(1989) (internal quotations omitted). Under the common law, a "depraved heart
represents a level of extreme recklessness and wanton disregard for human life."
United States v. Livoti, 22 F. Supp.2d 235, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (emphasis
original) (quoting United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 552 (5 th Cir. 1989));
see also United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389, 400 (3 rd Cir. 2014) ("Depravedheart murder is a murder resulting from an act so reckless and careless of the
safety of others that it demonstrates the perpetrator's complete lack of regard for
human life." (internal citations omitted)); Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 506
n.6 (D.C. App., 2005) ("depraved heart murder" was "also expressed at common
law as a 'wanton recklessness' to constitute common-law second-degree
murder"); Alston v. State, 643 A.2d 468, 472-73 (Md. Ct. App., 1994) ("depraved
heart" malice is "the willful doing of a dangerous and reckless act with wanton

indifference to the consequences and perils involved') (emphasis original)
10

(quoting DeBettencourt v. State, 428 A.2d 479 (1981 )).

A defendant with a

depraved heart '"is indifferent as to whether death results, or he may even hope
that it will not result."' Dishman v. State, 721 A.2d 699, 708 (Md. App. 1998)
(quoting 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 15, at 286-87 (15 th Ed.
1994 )).

The "essential concept" of malice, including "unintentional homicide

under circumstances evincing a depraved mind or an abandoned and malignant
heart," is "one of extreme recklessness regarding homicidal risk."
Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223, 1226-27 (Colo. 1988).

People v.

This Court has stated that

"malice is implied for any deliberate and cruel act against another, however
sudden, which shows an abandoned and malignant heart, and the facts show
there was malice in the acts of the defendant at the time of the killing."

State v.

Willis, 24 Idaho 252, 265, 132 P.2d 962, 967 (1913).
In contrast to depraved-heart murder, manslaughter "is the unlawful killing
of a human being ... without malice" either because it is "upon a sudden quarrel
or heat of passion" (voluntary) or "in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate
any unlawful act ... or in the operation of any firearm in a reckless, careless or
negligent manner which produces death." I.C. § 18-4006.
Depraved heart second-degree murder requires a conscious
disregard of the risk, sufficient under the circumstances, to manifest
extreme indifference to the value of human life. Recklessness that
can be assimilated to purpose or knowledge is treated as depraved
heart second-degree murder, and less extreme recklessness is
punished as manslaughter. Conviction of depraved heart seconddegree murder requires proof that the defendant acted recklessly
under the circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human fife. This language describes a kind of culpability
that differs in degree but not in kind from the ordinary recklessness
required for manslaughter.
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State v. Deal, 206 P.3d 529, 872 (Kan. App. 2009) (emphasis original) (quoting
State v. Robinson, 934 P.2d 38 (Kan. 1997)). In this case the evidence supports
a finding of a degree of recklessness amounting to extreme indifference to
Stephanie's life, rather than the ordinary recklessness required for manslaughter.
The present case is indistinguishable from Dowda v. State, 776 So.2d 714
(Miss. App. 2000). In that case, Dowda obtained a .380 caliber semi-automatic
handgun and then confronted his girlfriend, Jarrett, about her attending a concert,
and an argument ensued.

kl

at 715. Dowda initially threatened to kill himself

with the weapon, but then removed the clip from the gun and placed it in a closet.

kl

The argument continued until Jarrett admitted having sexual relations with

other men.

kl

At that point Dowda "took the gun from the closet, pressed the

gun tightly against Jarrett's head and pulled the trigger, killing her instantly.
Dowda apparently believed the gun to be unloaded because he had removed the
clip from the gun. Instead, one bullet had remained in the chamber ready to be
fired."

kl
The court considered whether Dowda was properly convicted of murder

under a "depraved heart" theory of malice.

kl

at 715-16. The appellate court

addressed the question in two steps, first whether the belief that the gun was
unloaded made the crime manslaughter, rather than murder, as a matter of law
and, second, if the evidence supported a murder conviction.

kl at 716.

As to the

legal question, the Court concluded that "a person's pulling the trigger on a
weapon that has been placed against another's head, even when the first person
believes the gun to be unloaded, can nonetheless be an act that is in utter
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disregard for life."

kl at 716.

As to the factual question, the court concluded that

the evidence supported the conviction.

kl

The same result applies in this case. The evidence supports findings that
Herrera, still under the influence of marijuana and methamphetamine, argued
with Stephanie. At some point, Herrera retrieved a .380 caliber semi-automatic
pistol and removed the clip.

Stephanie began packing her things to leave.

Herrera put the gun against her forehead and pulled the trigger, firing the bullet in
the chamber into Stephanie's brain, killing her.

Even assuming that Herrera

believed the gun to be unloaded because he pulled the clip, the act of putting the
barrel of that gun to Stephanie's head and pulling the trigger under the
circumstances of this case showed an abandoned and malignant heart because
it was reckless to a degree evincing wanton indifference to human life.
Herrera argues that "case law and authority involving deaths resulting
from the firing of 'unloaded' firearms uniformly supports Mr. Herrera's contention
that the evidence is insufficient to support a second degree murder conviction."
(Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Herrera's claim of uniformity fails by merely reading
beyond the quoted parts of the cases and authority he cites. For example, 40
Am. Jur.2d, Homicide § 90 (2014) (emphasis added) (2008 version cited at
Appellant's brief, p. 13) states: "With few exceptions, every unintentional killing of
a human being arising from a wanton or reckless use of firearms, in the absence
of an intent to discharge the weapon, or in the belief that it is not loaded, and
under circumstances not evidencing a hearl devoid of a sense of social duty, is
manslaughter."

2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 171 (15 th Ed. 2014) (emphasis

13

added) (1994 version cited at Appellant's brief, p. 13) provides: "Ordinarily, an
unintended killing as a result of the reckless or criminally negligent use of a
firearm constitutes manslaughter." Of course the statements that "ordinarily" or
"with few exceptions" death resulting from the discharge of a gun the defendant
thinks unloaded is manslaughter is entirely consistent with the state's argument,
set forth above, that only extreme recklessness, to a degree evincing wanton
indifference to human life, satisfies the requirement of depraved heart murder,
while lesser versions of recklessness satisfy only manslaughter.

The omitted

language, however, eviscerates Herrera's argument that homicide with what the
defendant believes to have been an unloaded gun is "uniformly" manslaughter.
Likewise, the cases cited by Herrera do not show that the jury erred in
evaluating his culpability.

In Tait v. State, 669 So.2d 85, 89-90 (Miss. 1996)

(cited Appellant's brief, p. 14), the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that
uncontroverted evidence of an eyewitness that the defendant and the victim were
"joking around and horseplaying" with the gun and the defendant "fell to the
ground and started crying" after shooting his friend was insufficient to support a
verdict for depraved heart murder. A few years later, however, the Mississippi
Court of Appeals in Dowda, as set forth above, upheld a conviction for seconddegree murder under facts indistinguishable from this case. Dowda, 776 So.2d
at 715-16. Authority from the same jurisdiction Herrera relies on for his claim that
the authorities "uniformly" require manslaughter supports the state's position that
Herrera's crime was properly decided by the jury to be second-degree murder.
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In W.L.H. v. State, 702 So.2d 1347-48 (Fla. App., 5th Dist., 1997) (cited at
Appellant's brief, p. 15), a 12-year-old boy took his parent's pistol, put in a clip,
worked the slide, removed the clip, and then, thinking the gun would not fire once
he removed the clip, shot his cousin in the head. The Florida court upheld the
determination of juvenile delinquency for manslaughter.

kt

at 1348.

In its

analysis, however, the court, citing Dellinger v. State, 495 So.2d 197 (Fla. App.,
5th Dist., 1986), specifically noted "authority for a finding, under the instant facts,
of second degree murder had W.L.H. been an adult."

&

Dellinger, in turn, is a case bearing significant resemblance to this one.
Dellinger was alone with his wife in their bedroom, and they were arguing.
Dellinger, 495 So.2d at 198. The wife started packing a suitcase.

kt

Dellinger testified he picked up a rifle and pointed it in the
direction of his wife. He said he meant to get her attention and
scare her. He did not think the rifle was loaded, but he did not
check to see whether it was loaded or not. Dellinger stated to his
wife that he could shoot her, and he pressed the trigger.
Apparently, his wife was not frightened because she did not turn
around to look at him, and was still arguing with him when she was
struck by the bullet.

kt

Dellinger, appearing distraught, carried his wife from the bedroom stating he

accidentally shot her.

kt

The court held that Dellinger's act of pointing the rifle

"without knowing (and thus without caring) whether or not it was loaded, and then
deliberately pull[ing] the trigger" supported the conviction.

kt at 198-99.

The difference between manslaughter and depraved heart murder is the
degree of recklessness. When that recklessness rises to the level of showing an
abandoned and malignant heart, the resulting homicide is properly considered
second-degree murder. Here the evidence supports such a finding. Therefore,
15

Herrera has failed to show that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction.

11.
Herrera Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of Statements Of
The Victim Showing Her State Of Mind

A

Introduction
Although it was clear from the evidence that Herrera shot Stephanie in the

head, the context surrounding that act was contested at trial. Herrera admitted
that there had been an argument and that Stephanie had been packing, but
minimized those facts by claiming that the argument was over or largely over by
the time of the shooting and by claiming that Stephanie was not packing to leave
him, but instead merely packing to spend Christmas day with her family. (Trial
Tr., vol. II, p. 88, Ls. 9-15 (admitting arguments but denying any violence in their
relationship); p. 90, L. 10 - p. 91, L. 1 (admitting Stephanie threatened to break
up with him but was never serious about it); p. 106, L. 22 - p. 107, L. 6 (claiming
Stephanie often carried dirty clothes to her parents house); p. 111, L. 15 - p.
113, L. 2 (stating that the morning of the homicide he got on her phone without
permission to see if she had been communicating with other men, that he
confronted her about it, she was "upset" that he accessed her phone without
permission, but there was not "much of an argument" about it); p. 114, L 23 - p.
115, L. 15 (after "dropp[ing] the discussion" about her communicating with other
men, Stephanie started packing, but only "so she could go over to her mother's
house for Christmas"); p. 115, L. 6 - p. 116, L. 18 (as she was "gathering her
things up" there was a "discussion" but not an "argument" about his refusal to
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spend Christmas with her family); p. 118, L. 24 - p. 119, L. 25 (the "process of
gathering her things" lasted only a "couple [of] minutes," during which there was
no yelling and no threatening and no one was angry); p. 122, L. 1 - p. 126, L. 2
(before giving Stephanie a ride to her parents' house he decided to remove the
clip from the pistol that was in the nightstand to make it safe while he was away
from the house); p. 126, L. 3 - p. 128, L. 4 (to emphasize his desire to not go to
her parents', he stated (unseriously) he "would rather shoot [himself] than go"
and "pointed the gun towards [himself]"); p. 128, Ls. 3-10 (when he pointed the
gun in his general direction Stephanie "grabbed the barrel of the of the gun and
pulled it and it went off'); State's Exhibits 10, 11 (admitting heated argument and
packing but downplaying their significance to the shooting).)
The state presented evidence that Stephanie was fed up with Herrera and
determined to leave him at the time of the homicide by using statements she
made to friends and family.

Specifically, the state presented evidence that

Stephanie told her sister, the day before Herrera killed her, "[I am] starting to
realize [Herrera] really doesn't care. I thought I'd be a lot more sad about it but I
think I might hate him too much to be sad."

(Exhibit 12 (spelling and

capitalization altered); Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 327, L. 3 - p. 328, L. 18.) Three other
witnesses testified that Stephanie told them in the weeks leading to the homicide
that she tried to break up with Herrera, but had been unsuccessful because he
had become violent or threatened suicide. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 329, L. 13 - p. 332,
L. 7; vol. II, p. 13, L. 21 - p. 19, L. 16; p. 64, L. 3 - p. 66, L. 21.) The court
instructed the jury in all three instances to consider the evidence only to
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determine Stephanie's state of mind and not for the truth of any factual matter
asserted. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 311, L. 19 - p. 312, L. 2; p. 331, Ls. 1-8; vol. 11, p.
15, L. 22 - p. 16, L. 4; p. 64, Ls. 10-14; 6/19/13 Tr., p. 6, L. 24- p. 7, L. 5.)
On appeal Herrera asserts the district court erred by allowing admission of
evidence of Stephanie's statements regarding her desire to leave Herrera,
asserting it was inadmissible under I.RE. 803(3). (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-26.)
"Each statement attributed to Ms. Camack and admitted over Mr. Herrera's
objection included a recitation of Ms. Comack's memory of prior acts and her
belief about those acts" rather than establish a relevant state of mind.
(Appellant's brief, p. 26.) This argument fails because evidence of Stephanie's
statements about her intent to leave Herrera demonstrates her state of mind at
the time of the homicide that refutes Herrera's attempt to minimize the
circumstances surrounding the shooting.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A trial court's decision to admit or exclude hearsay evidence will not be

overturned absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Burgess v. Salmon
River Canal Co, Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995).

C.

The Statements Were Properly Admitted To Show Stephanie's Mental
State Of Dissatisfaction With The Relationship And Her Desire To End It
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." I.RE. 801 (c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible
unless a hearsay exception applies. I.R.E. 802. One such exception applies to a
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"statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or
physical condition," including but not limited to "intent, plan, motive, design [or]
mental feeling," "but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed." I.R.E. 803(3).
Evidence of statements by a homicide victim may be admitted under I.R.E.
803(3) "only after a determination that (1) the declaration is relevant, and (2) the
need for and value of such testimony outweighs the possibility of prejudice to the
defendant." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 364, 247 P.3d 582, 591 (2010).
There are generally four categories of relevance for evidence of statements by
the victim, including "when the defendant claims the killing was accidental" and
"when a specific 'mens rea' is in issue."

lit

"Explanatory circumstances and

declarations connected with the commission of a homicide, which have a
tendency to shed light on the motives of the parties, are admissible in evidence,
including antecedent declarations made by the deceased and the defendant,
where they form some link in the chain of circumstances, explanatory of their
motives."

State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727, 731-32, 471 P.2d 582, 586-87

(1970) (quotations omitted). Review of the application of these legal standards in
two cases, State v. Radabaugh, where the evidence was properly admitted, and
State v. Goodrich, where the evidence was erroneously admitted, is informative
and ultimately leads to the conclusion that this case is more like Radabaugh, and
therefore there was no error.
Radabaugh killed his landladies. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho at 728, 471 P.2d
at 583. He asserted he had been drinking, blacked out, and had no memory of
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how the women were killed.

kL

The Court held that evidence of two statements

by one of the victims was properly admitted at trial. First, that the victim stated
she was "scared to death" of Radabaugh because "when he's drinking whiskey
he's crazier than a tick."

Id. at 731, 471 P.2d at 586.

This statement was

properly admitted with a limiting instruction because it "was probative of the
attitudes and feelings (fear) of the victim towards Radabaugh."

kt

Second, that

the victim told Radabaugh he "might as well get his stuff and go back to skid row
where he came from, because she was closing the hotel and moving to Texas
with her son."

kL

This evidence was properly admitted with a limiting instruction

"to show motive on the part of Radabaugh."

kt

The Court applied the standard articulated in Radabaugh in State v.
Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 546 P.2d 1180 (1976), but reached the opposite result.
In that case Goodrich shot and killed her ex-husband.

The ex-husband was

living in the same house as Goodrich and had gotten up late at night, in his
underwear, and was having a drink of water at the sink when Goodrich shot him.
Goodrich claimed she shot him believing him to be an intruder.

kL

at 474-75,

546 P .2d at 1182-83.
The trial court admitted evidence of four statements by the decedent to a
third party: (1) that the defendant had shot at him five years previously; (2) that
the defendant had threatened to kill him after a fight a few months before the
homicide; (3) that defendant attacked a woman the decedent was dancing with a
couple of months before the homicide; and (4) defendant caused a bar fight
resulting in he and a friend being badly beaten.
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kt

at 476, 546 P.2d at 1184.

Evidence showing the state of mind of the decedent is admissible "where the
declarant-victim's state of mind is relevant" and its probative value is not
outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.

kl

at 477, 546 P.2d at 1185.

Evidence of statements by the victim regarding prior threats, past violence, or
generalized fear have "some value in presenting to the jury a complete picture of
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the homicide," but a court must be
careful to guard against the jury concluding the evidence "reflect[s] on
defendant's state of mind rather than the victim's."
The

Court

ultimately

held

the

evidence

kL at 477,

of the

546 P.2d at 1185.

decedent's

statements

inadmissible, and found "unfair prejudice" because there had been no limiting
instruction at trial.

kL at 478-79,

546 P.2d at 1186-87.

The district court applied the correct precedents and legal test in this case
and concluded that, upon a showing that the defense was claiming that the
homicide was accidental, some of the testimony proffered by the state would be
admissible to show state of mind. 1 (Hearing Tr., p. 150, L. 14 - p. 156, L. 20.)
The present case is like Radabaugh and unlike Goodrich.
Herrera, in both statements to the police and on the stand, contended that
the shooting was accidental, and downplayed the circumstances surrounding it.
Stephanie's statements regarding her mental state of dissatisfaction with the

In this case the third and fourth categories of relevance (accident and mens rea)
are relevant because the issue presented was whether Herrera shot Stephanie
with a merely reckless state of mind, and thus committed involuntary
manslaughter, or whether he acted with an extreme amount of recklessness
amounting to malice. The analysis under either category is substantially the
same.
1
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relationship, her desire to end it, and the difficulties she was encountering in
actually ending it were relevant to the issue of whether the shooting was the
result of negligence, mere recklessness, or malice. The evidence showing that
Stephanie's state of mind included a desire to leave the relationship made it
more likely that Herrera and Stephanie were arguing, perhaps heatedly, rather
than having the calm "discussion" described by Herrera. It made it more likely
that the argument was about the future of the relationship rather than about
Herrera's unauthorized access of Stephanie's cell phone. It made it more likely
that Stephanie was packing her things to move out rather than just packing some
laundry to wash at her parents' house, as claimed by Herrera. The evidence of
Stephanie's state of mind, specifically her desire to end the relationship and her
inability to accomplish that end previously, was relevant to the circumstances
surrounding the homicide, and therefore relevant to the question of whether the
shooting was an accident, the result of negligence or mere recklessness, or
whether the shooting was the result of malice.
Moreover, any risk that the jury applied the evidence to determine
Herrera's state of mind or actions was minimized by the court's instructions that
the evidence was to be considered only for the limited purpose of Stephanie's
state of mind. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct.
App. 1997) Uury presumed to follow instructions).
The evidence was relevant to show Stephanie's state of mind. Her state
of mind was important to determine the surrounding circumstances of the
shooting, especially the type and severity of the argument and the meaning of
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Stephanie's act of packing just before Herrera shot her. Such was significant in
determining whether Herrera acted with malice, or merely negligence because
the shooting was an accident. Limiting instructions reduced or eliminated the risk
that the jury would consider the evidence for a purpose other than that for which
it was admitted. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion.

D.

Any Error In Admission Of The Evidence Was Harmless
Even if this Court concludes that some of the evidence was not properly

admitted under the state of mind exception, any error in the district court's
evidentiary ruling was harmless. Where evidence is erroneously admitted, the
test for determining if the error was harmless is '"whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction and that the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 488, 873 P.2d 122,
133 (1994) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 762, 810 P.2d 680, 700
(1991 )); see also State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 976, 829 P.2d 861, 865
(1992) (quoting State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034, 1043 (1980))
(to hold erroneous admission of evidence harmless, court must '"declare a belief,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that [the]
evidence complained of contributed to the conviction'") (brackets original). The
state has the burden of demonstrating that an objected-to error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961,
974 (2010).
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The evidence that Herrera deliberately put a pistol against Stephanie's
head and intentionally pulled the trigger is overwhelming.

Evidence that

Stephanie made several statements that she was dissatisfied with the
relationship and wanted to end it but had failed to because Herrera became
violent or suicidal is certainly relevant to the nature of the argument preceding
the shooting and whether Stephanie was packing to leave permanently or
temporarily, but such evidence was not central to the case.

Although the

circumstances surrounding Herrera's act of putting the barrel of the pistol against
Stephanie's forehead and pulling the trigger certainly inform the finding of malice,
the act itself leads to the conclusion that Herrera acted with malice.
Furthermore, the district court repeatedly instructed the jury that the
evidence was to be considered only for Stephanie's state of mind and not for the
truth of any matter asserted. Following that instruction, as we presume the jury
did, Kilby, 130 Idaho at 751, 947 P.2d at 424, the evidence went only to show
Stephanie's state of mind, and therefore what her actions may have been, and
not to show the truth of the matter asserted, and therefore what Herrera's actions
may have been.
Because the evidence is overwhelming, and the limiting instruction
eliminated or at least reduced any potential for prejudice, any error in the
admission of the state of mind evidence was harmless.
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111.
The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Herrera's Motions For Mistrial

A

Introduction
During

the

trial

a

witness

(Stephanie's

sister,

Kaytlin

Camack)

volunteered, without being asked, that she saw "handprint bruises" on Stephanie
at Thanksgiving. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 312, Ls. 6-16.) Herrera moved for a mistrial.
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 312, L. 17 - p. 314, L. 12.) The district court denied the
motion, concluding that there was no direct, but only inferential, linkage of the
bruises to Herrera. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 314, L. 19 - p. 315, L. 3.) The district
court elected to strike the offending testimony and prohibit the witness from
testifying further about any events at Thanksgiving to prevent any tying of the
bruises to Herrera. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 315, L. 3 - p. 317, L. 5; p. 326, Ls. 18-23.)
Another witness, Stephanie's step-mother, Bobbie Jo Riddle, testified that
Stephanie stated that Herrera "slapped her around, choked her." (Trial Tr., vol.
II, p. 17, Ls. 3-7.) A "brief discussion at the bench" at the request of defense
counsel followed. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 17, Ls. 8-14.) The district court thereafter
instructed the jury to disregard the "statements about slapping and choking" and
"not rely on them in any way." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 17, Ls. 15-23.)
Later in the proceedings counsel, acknowledging that he had not moved
for a mistrial in relation to Riddle's stricken testimony, renewed the motion for
mistrial he made in relation to Kaytlin Comack's testimony. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p.
54, Ls. 7-17.)

He asked the court to consider other objections that had been

made and sustained, including the objection leading to the striking of Riddle's
testimony that Stephanie had made statements about slapping and choking.
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(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 54, L. 18 - p. 57, L. 3.) The court denied the renewed motion,
concluding that it was "confident" that the jury could follow its curative
instructions. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 57, Ls. 4-20.)

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal, the standard for review of a motion for mistrial is well-

established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of the circumstances existing when
the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be
whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial
represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full
record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a
criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer.
The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error.
[The appellate court's] focus is upon the continuing impact on the
trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that
incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted).

Herrera bears the burden of showing that the trial court

committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial. State v.
Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30,674 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983).

C.

Herrera Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That
The Jury Could Follow The Curative Instructions
A mistrial is appropriate where there has been conduct, inside or outside

of the courtroom, that is "prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant
of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Thus, the event triggering the mistrial motion must
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be both prejudicial and deprive the defendant of a fair trial in order to warrant a
mistrial.
"The admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the
declaration of a mistrial." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128,
136 (Ct. App. 2008). "Where improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into
a trial and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it
is ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely." State
v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004).
"We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to
disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it,
unless there is an 'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be
unable to follow that court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that
the effect of the evidence would be 'devastating' to the defendant."

kl (quoting Greer v.

Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)).

In this case a witness volunteered a statement that she saw "handprint
bruises" on the victim.

The court instructed the jury to not consider the

statement, and prevented any further evidence that might tie the bruises to
Herrera. Later, another witness testified Stephanie stated that Herrera slapped
and choked her. This statement did not draw a motion for a mistrial, but it did
draw an objection and an instruction striking the testimony.

Although the

improper evidence was unfairly prejudicial, and thus properly excluded and
stricken, it did not create an overwhelming probability that the jury would
disregard the curative instructions given by the district court. Herrera has failed
to show error in the district court's finding that it was confident that the curative
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instructions would be followed and therefore there was no prejudice requiring a
mistrial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction.
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